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Abstract
Local governments in China are facing heavy debt burdens, a low level of ﬁs-
cal transparency and a lack of constraints by local democracy. Since 2008, local 
government debts have skyrocketed. This article analyses the current state and 
features of local government debts and the two kinds of 'quasi municipal bonds' 
in China—urban investment bonds and local government bonds—along with 
their problems and risks. It examines the risks connected with local government 
debts and these bonds from the perspectives of public ﬁnance and political 
economy. It concludes with a discussion of a framework of rules for local gov-
ernment debt ﬁnancing, especially for the issuance of municipal bonds in China. 
Keywords: local government debt, urban development bonds, local government 
bonds, local government financing vehicle companies, municipal bonds, China
Introduction
Administrative and ﬁscal decentralization in the early 1980s led to the 
formation of strong local political interests and to a certain degree of 
regional and local autonomy with relatively hard budget constraints 
for local governments (Herrmann-Pillath and Feng 2004; Jin, Qian and 
Weingast 2005).1 However, it took place under a system of authoritarian 
government, including both the central government and local govern-
ments. The decentralization gave rise to ﬁerce competition among local 
governments in China (Li, Li and Zhang 1998; Feng 2010). And the close 
link between local government revenue and expenditure provides strong 
incentives for local governments to drive local economic development. 
Although China is formally a unitary system, government behaviour can 
be well described by employing a 'competitive governments' paradigm 
(Breton 1996; Herrmann-Pillath 1999; Herrmann-Pillath and Feng 2004) or 
a 'competitive authoritarianism' paradigm (Levitsky and Way 2013).2  
Local state developmentalism has led to rapid industrialization and 
urbanization across China, which have progressed at breakneck speed 
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since 1996. During both processes, local governments have been faced 
with increased ﬁnancial pressure and a widening gap between revenue 
and expenditure. Accordingly, local governments, especially at the city 
and county level, have faced continually increasing debts. This problem 
became much more serious after a rapid expansion of local government 
debt took place with the central government's launch of the stimulus 
package in 2008. It has caught the attention of the government and 
society. More and more people are looking at problems of near unre-
strained debt ﬁnancing behaviour, low ﬁscal transparency and high 
ﬁscal risks of local governments. 'Municipal bond' issuances as part 
of actual or hidden local government debts have become increasingly 
visible. The enforcement of a suitable framework of rules regulating 
local debt ﬁnancing, including 'municipal bond' issuance, has become 
necessary in this situation. 
Almost without exception, the existing literature on local government 
debt in China mainly deals with the size, growth, causes and risks of 
local government debt. However, because of the adoption of a proactive 
debt ﬁnancing strategy never seen before and encouraged by the central 
government, as well as the rapid increase in the size of local govern-
ment debt since 2008, the literature on the empirical assessment of the 
level of ﬁscal risks of local governments prior to that year has become 
less relevant. Given the lack of transparency of local debt ﬁnancing, 
up-to-date and in-depth empirical studies are still in the early stages, 
mainly focusing on some particular dimensions of local government 
debt. For instance, He and Man (2011) assess the size, growth, causes 
and risks of interest-bearing debts of local government investment and 
ﬁnancing vehicle companies of Chinese provinces. Their study shows 
that the ﬁscal risks in some provinces are relatively high in terms of 
the ratio of debt balance to local budgetary revenue. However, the as-
sessed debt constitutes only a part of local government debt, thus an 
incomplete reﬂection of the overall situation of debt ﬁnancing of local 
governments. Yu and Wei (2012) estimate the total size of government 
debt in 2010. Lu (2012) analyses quite systematically the problems of 
local government vehicle companies in China. As a supplement to the 
empirical assessments, additional analyses are made from a political 
economy perspective. Brenan and Buchanan (1980, 1985) elaborate on 
government behaviour with self-interest maximizing models and derive 
some necessary constitutional rules for 'taming' the government from a 
theoretical perspective of constitutional economics. Feng and Li (2005) 
and Zheng (2012) adopt such a perspective to elaborate the self-interest 
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oriented 'leviathan' features of local governments in debt ﬁnancing in 
China and problems with the lack of democracy and ﬁscal surveillance, 
and identiﬁed their negative effects on the private sector development of 
local China.3 In summary, there is still a lack of a balanced analysis of the 
local government debt and the issuance of 'municipal bonds' from both 
the political economy and public ﬁnance perspectives. Without such an 
analysis, we are less likely to get deep insights into the problems of local 
government debt and to identify rules regulating local governments' 
debt ﬁnancing behaviour. 
This article is an effort to help meet the need for research that combines 
the above mentioned two perspectives. In the following, the author ﬁrst 
makes a more concrete assessment of the current state and problems 
of local government debt in China based on available data, focusing 
on the characteristics and functioning of the existing two types of local 
government debt bonds, i.e. 'urban investment bonds' (cheng tou zhai) 
and 'local government bonds' (difang zhengfu zhai),4 which are similar to 
municipal bonds in the Anglo-American context but deviate from them 
to some degree. The article also looks at problems with the regulatory 
framework currently in place for the management of local government 
debt, especially the issuance of these debt bonds. The article concludes 
with a discussion of a framework of rules to regulate local government 
debt ﬁnancing, including the issuance of municipal bonds of the typical 
types prevailing in some developed economies such as the USA.
Local Government Debt in China: The Current Situation
There are a number of different deﬁnitions of local government debts 
in China. The ﬁrst is a narrow one: actual government debt when total 
expenditure exceeds total revenue of local governments. Therefore, lo-
cal government debt can be interpreted as the difference between the 
total local expenditure and the total local revenue of a local government, 
where the total local expenditure includes the budgetary, extra-budget-
ary and system-external expenditures and total local revenue includes 
the budgetary, extra-budgetary and system-external revenues.5 This 
deﬁnition includes many types of debts, such as government loans from 
businesses or banks, short-term inter-governmental loans, debts owed 
to construction companies or teams for public works projects, etc. 
However, local governments in China must also take on the debt for 
projects of companies that are directly or indirectly under them. There-
fore, a broader deﬁnition of government debt should also include part 
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or all of such debt. Unless otherwise stated, local government debt in 
China in this article should be understood in the context of this second, 
broader deﬁnition.
The 'Budget Law' of China explicitly provides that
Local budgets at various levels shall be compiled according to the principles 
of keeping expenditure within the limits of revenue and maintaining a balance 
between revenue and expenditure, and shall not contain deﬁcits. Except for 
where provided by law or State Council regulation, local governments shall 
not issue local government debt bonds. (Article 28)
The 'General Lending Provisions' and 'Guarantee Law' of China also 
prohibit local governments from taking loans from banks. However, 
local governments deal with deﬁcit ﬁnancing through their projects 
or companies, or some subordinate public institutions such as public 
schools or hospitals and are able to ﬁnd ways to issue openly or covertly, 
directly or indirectly, a large amount of debt and this phenomenon 
has become increasingly common. The whole process lacks transpar-
ency. The debt ﬁnancing problem has become more serious since 2008 
with the global ﬁnancial crisis, when the central government released 
a 4 trillion RMB stimulus package and allowed local governments to 
engage in deﬁcit ﬁnancing proactively by taking out large loans from 
banks to invest mainly in infrastructure projects. This set the stage for 
the emergence of a large number of local ﬁnancing vehicle companies 
(difang rongzi pingtai gongsi, hereafter referred to as 'ﬁnancing vehicle 
companies') connected to local governments.
Statistics from the China Banking Regulatory Commission show that 
as of May 2009, there were 8,221 ﬁnancing vehicle companies at the 
provincial, prefecture and county levels registered in China. Of these, 
4,907 were registered at the county level. The 2010 Report on Regional 
Financial Operations of the People's Bank of China shows that by the 
end of 2010, there were over 10,000 ﬁnancing vehicle companies estab-
lished by local governments, up 25 per cent over 2008. Of these ﬁnanc-
ing vehicle companies, 70 per cent were at the county level or below. 
According to the audit report of the National Audit Ofﬁce (2011), there 
were in total 6,576 ﬁnancing vehicle companies at the provincial, pre-
fecture and county level in 2010.
These ﬁnancing vehicle companies have been quickly established by 
local governments through the allocation of land, equity shares, fees and 
national bonds and have a level of capital or cash ﬂow that allows them 
to carry out ﬁnancing. When needed, they can also act to supplement 
funds from general ﬁscal revenue and land revenue, and even provide 
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direct or indirect government credit guarantees. These companies use 
various methods to bring ﬁnancing capital into their regions, then trans-
fer it to public enterprises or institutions for projects of varying degrees 
of proﬁtability, including urban infrastructure projects. 
Financing vehicle companies usually appear as urban construction 
investment companies (chengtou gongsi). They may also be called 'ur-
ban development' and 'urban ﬁnancing' companies. The operational 
structure of ﬁnancing vehicle companies is shown in Figure 1. These 
companies are always fully owned or controlled by local governments. 
Some are even listed on stock exchanges. Local governments use land 
transfer revenue, ﬁscal subsidies or even government credit as guaran-
tees for ﬁnancing vehicle companies looking to obtain loans, or issue 
'urban investment bonds' to ﬁnancial organizations or other investors 
on securities markets. These ﬁnancing vehicle companies then take the 
funds that they have collected and invest them in urban construction 
projects. However, these projects often cannot repay the loans that fund 
them. The responsibility for repaying these loans thus falls on the local 
governments, which implies that if a large-scale debt crisis emerges, the 
ones ultimately responsible are taxpayers at the local level or possibly 
even at the national level.
Under this backdrop, debt accumulated by ﬁnancing vehicle compa-
nies continues to grow. The 2010 data deserves special attention since 
FIGURE 1: Operating Model of Local Government Financing Vehicle 
Companies
Source: The author.
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several sources revealed different data for the ﬁrst time. Based on the 
comparison between them, one can estimate the overall debt size of lo-
cal governments or even the whole government system more precisely 
than before. 
Figure 2 shows the scale of interest-bearing debt held by the 340 of 
these companies that issued urban investment bonds in China from 
2006 to 2009. These data include short- and long-term loans, interest 
payable and bonds payable held by them. The size of interest-bearing 
debt of these companies increased rapidly from RMB 4.79 trillion in 
2008 to RMB 7.97 trillion in 2009, reﬂecting the central government's 
new policy of encouraging local governments' deﬁcit ﬁnancing through 
their ﬁnancing vehicle companies. 
FIGURE 2: Amount of Interest-bearing Debt Held by Financing Vehicle 
Companies (2006-2009)
Source: He and Man (2011).
Local governments' debt ﬁnancing levels have increased rapidly up 
to now. Figure 3 shows the incomplete size of local governments' direct 
debt, revealed by various government departments. It increased from 
RMB 8.3 trillion in 2010 to RMB 11.4 trillion in 2012. According to the 
data revealed by the China Banking Regulatory Commission, bank loans 
alone held by ﬁnancing vehicle companies amounted to RMB 9.2 tril-
lion by the end of 2012 (Netease Finance 2013a), while the debt balance 
of urban investment bonds, mid-term notes and short-term ﬁnancing 
notes, private targeted ﬁnancing instruments, and asset-backed notes 
of ﬁnancing vehicle companies reached RMB 2.5 trillion (Zhang 2013). 
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This does not include the direct debt held by government departments, 
construction project companies, units for public services such as public 
schools and hospitals, and payables for construction teams or compa-
nies. 
FIGURE 3: Amount of Direct Debt of Local Governments (2010-2013)
Note: The 2010 data includes the direct debt held by all ﬁnancing vehicle companies audited by 
the National Audit Ofﬁce (2011). The data of 2011-2013 are revealed or predicted by the State 
Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (Yang 2013). These government depart-
ments reported only a narrowly deﬁned debt size of a part of vehicle companies, while the debt 
size of the remaining part has been kept hidden resulting in an underreporting of the actual 
direct debt size of vehicle companies. Therefore, the data in Figure 3 are incomplete.
Sources: National Audit Ofﬁce (2011); Yang (2013).
In the following, we can estimate the total debt of local governments 
in China at the end of 2012. The total amount of direct and indirect debt 
held by local governments was at least RMB 25.11 trillion, or 48.35 per 
cent of GDP at the end of 2012 (Table 1). Out of this, the total balance of 
loans for ﬁnancing vehicle companies was RMB 9.2 trillion, according to 
the China Banking Regulatory Commission (Shi 2013). According to the 
calculation based on the databank provided by Wind Financial Infor-
mation System, the total debt balance of urban investment bonds, mid-
term notes, short-term ﬁnancing notes, private targeted debt ﬁnancing 
instruments and asset-backed notes was RMB 2.5 trillion (Zhang 2013). 
Because of the strict regulations of the China Banking Regulatory Com-
mission and the Securities Commission, local governments increasingly 
rely on funds from trust fund borrowings, which are off-balance-sheet, 
and often request repurchase agreements as repayment guarantees. 
According to the China Trust Business Association, the balance of trust 
fund borrowing totalled RMB 0.5 trillion at the end of 2012 (Xu 2013). 
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The amount of borrowing by non-vehicle government project compa-
nies or public units can be estimated to be at least RMB 3 trillion, given 
that many project companies of all levels not only use funds transferred 
by ﬁnancing vehicle companies, but also borrow funds directly from 
banks and other sources. This is a low estimate by the author. The ratio 
of the narrowly deﬁned debt balance of ﬁnancing vehicle companies 
to the debt balance of local government departments and institutions 
in the 36 jurisdictions at various levels that were audited by National 
Audit Ofﬁce (2013) was 1.8:1 at the end of 2012,6 which is much lower 
than 3:1, the underlying ratio of China as a whole adopted here. This 
also implies that non-vehicle borrowing could eventually reach around 
half of the direct debt of ﬁnancing vehicle companies across China, i.e. 
as high as around RMB 5 trillion. The total payables for construction 
companies or teams or other units, and the balance of contingent debt 
can be estimated to be at least RMB 3.04 trillion for both, if taking only 
20 per cent of the above sum of direct debt as the basis for estimation. 
Hidden debt related to retirement insurance totalled RMB 2.23 trillion.7 
The balance of local government bonds (difang zhengfu zhaiquan) was 
RMB 650 billion at the end of 2012, according to Ministry of Finance 
statistics. Township-level government liabilities totalled RMB 830 billion 
in 2010 (Yu and Wei 2012). We take this ﬁgure as the estimated debt size 
of township-level governments at the end of 2012, while at the village 
level, the direct debt is estimated as RMB 120 billion. Villages are not 
legally governments, but here their function and operation is similar to 
self-governing entities as seen as in the West. According to the report 
of the Team of the Project on 'Research on Problems with County and 
Township Level Government Finance in China' (2005), the average net 
debt balance of each village was RMB 200,000 in 2002. The number 
of administrative villages was over 600,000 in 2012, according to the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs. Taking this average debt size as the base and 
disregarding the growth rate and a reduction in the number of villages 
through mergers, the total village net liabilities are estimated to be at 
least RMB 120 billion in 2012. 
For comparison, Standard Chartered (2013) estimated the current 
amount of the outstanding debt of ﬁnancing vehicle companies is in 
the range of RMB 14-15 trillion, some 30 per cent of Chinese GDP at 
the end of 2012. Our estimate of the debt is larger. Such a comparison is 
not very meaningful since it is unclear how Standard Chartered deﬁnes 
local government debt in China. 
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TABLE 1: Estimates of Local Government Liabilities in China at the 
End of 2012 (in trillion RMB)
Type of Liability Amount Scope Description
Total loans of ﬁnancing 
vehicle companies 9.2 Direct debt
Data provided by the China 
Banking Regulatory Com-
mission (Shi 2013).
Total debt balance of urban 
investment bonds, mid-term 
notes, short-term ﬁnanc-
ing notes, private targeted 
ﬁnancing instruments and 
asset-backed notes of ﬁnanc-
ing vehicle companies
2.5 Direct debt
Calculation based on Wind 
Financial Information 
System (Zhang 2013). The 
balance of urban invest-
ment bonds and mid-term 
notes is RMB 1.44 trillion (Li 
2013).
Trust fund borrowings 
(xintuo zijin) of local govern-
ments
0.5 Direct debt
Statistics of China Trust 
Business Association (Xu 
2013); including those of 
ﬁnancing vehicle companies 
and local government de-
partments and institutions.
Other borrowings of local 
government departments or 
institutions
3.0 Direct debt
Low estimate by author.
Payables of local govern-
ments for construction 
companies or teams
3.04 Direct debt
Low estimate of around 
20% of the above total direct 
debt of local governments.





Hidden guarantees by local 
government, low level of 
estimation of 20% of the 
above total debt of local 
governments excluding the 
payables.
Hidden debt related to 
retirement insurance 2.23 Hidden debt
Wang (2013).






Yu and Wei (2012).






Percentage of GDP 42.35%
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission; China Trust Business Association; Li (2013); 
Ministry of Finance; Wang (2013); Xu (2013); Yu and Wei (2012); Zhang (2013); and author's 
estimates.
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Table 2 estimates the total debt held by the central government and 
local governments in China, which is around RMB 44.89 trillion, tak-
ing 86.44 per cent of GDP at the end of 2012. This does not include 
contingent liabilities held by the central government. For comparison, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF; 2013)) released an estimate of 
the total 'augmented debt' of the Chinese government, including the 
central government and local governments, which totalled nearly 50 
per cent of China's GDP in 2013. Fewer forms of government debt are 
included in the deﬁnition of the 'augmented debt'. According to the 
IMF's explanation, augmented government debt not only includes the 
debt of a general government, but also 
captures borrowing by LGFVs [local government financing vehicle 
companies] through market ﬁnancing channels. As in other countries, 
it excludes liabilities of regular SOEs and other state entities as well as 
contingent liabilities, such as NPLs in the banking sector, policy bank loans, 
and pension liabilities. At the same time, it measures gross debt only, and 
so excludes government assets. (IMF 2013)
TABLE 2: Estimated Debts of Central and Local Governments in 
China at the End of 2012 (in trillion RMB)
Type of Debt Amount Description
Local government debt 25.11 See Table 1
Central government domestic debt 7.67 Ministry of Finance statistics
Central government foreign debt 0.08 Ministry of Finance statistics
Central government policy ﬁnan-
cial bonds
7.841
China Urban and Rural Fi-
nance Daily (2012)
Central government debt related 
to the transfer of non-performing 
loans to asset management com-
panies 
1.4
Yu and Wei (2012)
Department of Railways liabilities 2.79 Netease Finance (2013b)
Total government debt 44.89
Percentage of GDP 86.44%
Note: 1 This amount is the balance to 24 December 2012.
Sources: China Urban and Rural Finance News (2012); Ministry of Finance; Netease Finance 
(2013b); Yu and Wei (2012); and estimates included in the previous table.
Characteristics and Problems of Local Government Debt
While there are currently many types of local government debt, there 
are two rough categories that can be identiﬁed based on levels of local 
government activity in debt ﬁnancing. The ﬁrst is active debt ﬁnanc-
ing, which comes from the need for capital to fund local construction 
_________________________________________________________________________33
__________________________ Local Government Debt and Municipal Bonds in China
and economic development. The other is passive debt ﬁnancing due 
to excessive ﬁscal pressure, leaving governments without any other 
choice but to borrow money and go into debt. This also includes other 
passive liabilities caused by the bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises, 
losses from guaranteed projects and the take-over by local governments 
of ﬁnancial repayment responsibilities. There are essential differences 
in their causes, characteristics and impact on the local economy. The 
ﬁrst type is a general liability and can have a positive impact on the 
local economy. This type of liability can be standardized in the form of 
municipal bonds. However, the second type is incurred due to hidden 
deﬁcits and bad debts. This should not be replaced by issuing municipal 
bonds.
In general, local government debt has the following characteristics:
1. The overall debt level of local governments is already very high 
and will further increase in the coming years. The total amount of 
the debt balance of local governments rose rapidly after 2008 and 
reached a record high of 42.35 per cent of Chinese GDP at the end of 
2012, as shown in Table 1. According to the estimate by the National 
Audit Ofﬁce (2011), which encompasses only a narrowly deﬁned 
debt size of a part of vehicle companies, local governments' ratio 
of total debt balance to their total regular budgetary revenue was 
70.45 per cent across the whole country, and it even exceeded 100 
per cent in 78 prefecture-level cities and 99 counties (or county-level 
cities or districts) at the end of 2010. The ratio of direct debt to the 
consolidated local budgetary revenue (including ﬁscal transfer) of 
10 out of 36 audited local governments exceeded 100 per cent at the 
end of 2012, with 188.95 per cent as the highest ratio (National Audit 
Ofﬁce 2013). The central government and local governments have 
not taken measures to reduce debts, and they have kept expanding 
their spending, so that the overall trend will be a further rise in the 
debt levels of local governments. 
2.  The debt levels differ signiﬁcantly from one region to another. Ac-
cording to He and Man (2011), the levels of total interest-bearing debt 
of ﬁnancing vehicle companies of Chinese provinces differed widely 
in 2009: the ratio of total debt balance of ﬁnancing vehicle companies 
to local governments' total regular budgetary revenue ranged from 
0.11 in Guizhou province to 12.42 in Jiangsu province. 
3.  The debt structure is multi-levelled and complex. This is mainly 
due to remaining historical issues and the many reforms that have 
been implemented over the past nearly two decades. Local gov-
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ernment debts can be grouped into six categories based on their 
characteristics (Fan et al. 2001; He and Man 2011; Wang 2013). The 
six categories are: 
a. Debts held by local governments, their functional depart-
ments and associated entities for public services such as public 
schools and hospitals. This includes loans from international 
ﬁnancial organizations, on-lending funds raised by the Minis-
try of Finance by issuing treasury bills (guozhai zhuan dai zijin), 
local government bonds issued by the Ministry of Finance on 
behalf of local governments or by local governments them-
selves, loans from domestic ﬁnancial institutions and loans 
from other units or individuals; 
b. Debt guaranteed directly or indirectly by local governments; 
c. Dead debt caused by losses incurred by local government-
owned companies such as grain companies, or payables of 
local governments such as unpaid salaries and beneﬁts, and 
outstanding payments for local government procurements; 
d. Debt not directly owed by local governments, but by local 
government-owned trust and investment companies, banks, or 
local ﬁnancing vehicle companies; 
e. Debt resulting from failed local state-owned enterprises and 
the take-over by local governments of ﬁnancial repayment 
responsibilities such as the case of local government closing 
down Rural Cooperative Funds (nongcun hezuo jijinhui) by 
order of the central government in 1999; 
f. Hidden debt related to retirement insurance. 
Categories c, e and f involve passive debt ﬁnancing. Other categories 
are involved with both active and passive debt ﬁnancing. 
 4.  The funds raised are mainly used for local construction projects. Of 
the local spending of RMB 3, 643.4 billion audited by the National 
Audit Ofﬁce (2013), 92.14 per cent was used for construction projects 
in transport, public utilities, education, culture, science, healthcare, 
agriculture, water conservation, environmental protection, afford-
able housing, and land take and reserve.
5.  More and more debt is raised through ﬁnancing vehicle compa-
nies, especially by taking bank loans and issuing urban investment 
bonds. The total amount of local government bonds issued by the 
Ministry of Finance on behalf of local governments and by several 
local governments themselves as pilot measures has also increased. 
According to the National Audit Ofﬁce (2013), 78.07 per cent of the 
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debt balance of the audited 36 local governments was loans, and 
12.06 per cent was bonds at the end of 2012. 
6.  Debt ﬁnancing was discouraged by the central government before 
the outbreak of the global ﬁnancial crisis, explicitly encouraged by 
the central government in 2009,8 and tolerated by it to maintain a 
strong stimulus to the economy. However, some measures were 
taken to control ﬁscal risks related to local government debt, mainly 
by standardizing the operations of ﬁnancing vehicle companies and 
strengthening the loan control and the control of issuance of urban 
investment bonds.9 However, both loan balances and amount of 
urban investment bonds keep increasing. Local governments also 
resort to other types of ﬁnancial services, such as off-sheet ﬁnancial 
services of banking institutions and trust products to meet their 
demand for additional funds. In addition, the central government 
imposed upon local governments the task of building 36 million 
apartments for low-income people in the framework of the govern-
ment's affordable housing programme across China within the 12th 
planning period (2011-2015). This has led to greater ﬁscal pressure 
on local governments and the necessary tolerance by the central 
government of local governments' debt ﬁnancing on a vast scale. 
The following problems can be identiﬁed with the debt ﬁnancing of 
local governments:
1.  There is a lack of transparency in local governments' debt ﬁnancing. 
During the period prior to the mid-1990s, when ﬁscal affairs were 
managed independently, local debt was mainly comprised of open 
debts like unpaid accounts, the issuing of bonds and bank loans. 
Since the implementation of the Budget Law, released in 1994, a large 
part of debt has become hidden or contingent. In recent years, not 
only has open debt greatly increased, hidden debt has also steadily 
risen. For example, loans and ﬁnancing through ﬁnancing vehicle 
companies since 2008 are a type of open debt. Hidden debts mainly 
include contingent liabilities and unpaid costs such as salaries, work 
expenses, venue costs, roadways and bridges.
 2.  A part of the debt is not fully covered by guarantees or collaterals 
(He and Man 2011; National Audit Ofﬁce 2013). In addition to the 
debts of ﬁnancing vehicle companies, some guarantors provide 
guarantees for debt held by other companies. If there is a default 
with these other companies, the real value of the guarantees pro-
vided for the debt held by a vehicle company will be affected. There 
are also often cases where the same collateral (for instances the use 
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right of a piece of land) is repeatedly provided to back several debts 
owed to different creditors (so-called yi wu duo ya).
3. The assets of a signiﬁcant part of ﬁnancing vehicle companies are 
relatively poor and the registered capital of many ﬁnancing vehicle 
companies is insufﬁcient, unlawfully paid in, partly falsiﬁed or 
partly diverted for other uses. By the end of 2012, out of the 223 
ﬁnancing platform companies of the 36 audited local governments, 
there were 94 companies possessing assets of RMB 897.592 billion 
that are not or not easily realizable, accounting for 37.60 per cent of 
their total assets. Of these, ﬁve have registered capital of RMB 56.19 
billion that is not in place; six companies reported assets amounting 
to RMB 37.107 which did not exist; and local governments of three 
provincial capital cities injected unqualiﬁed capital totalling RMB 
4.553 billion in the form of parks, roads and other public assets 
(National Audit Ofﬁce 2013). Around one sixth of all the ﬁnanc-
ing vehicle companies had problems related to false or insufﬁcient 
capital registration or improper use of registered capital in 2010 (Nie 
2013). Taking Liaoning province as an example, in over one third of 
the 184 ﬁnancing vehicle companies in that province, part of their 
registered capital was false in 2010, and the income of 100 of them 
was insufﬁcient to cover the repayment of debt and interest in the 
same year (Li 2011).      
4. It is pervasive that local governments provide indirect or implicit 
guarantees for the debt repayment or provide some subsidy in case 
of a default with a local government-related debt (Cao 2013; Yang 
2013).  
5. The repayment of local government debt relies heavily on land 
transfer revenue and new borrowings and the repayment pressure 
is considerable (National Audit Ofﬁce 2011, 2013). According to the 
National Audit Ofﬁce (2011), local governments of 12 provinces, 307 
cities and 1,131 counties guaranteed repayment of 37.96 per cent of 
the assessed local government debt from their land transfer revenue 
in 2010. Of the debt payable in 2010, 54.65 per cent was repaid from 
funds raised by new borrowings. According to the National Audit 
Ofﬁce (2013), at the end of 2012, the ratio of direct debt repayments 
to consolidated local budgetary revenue (including ﬁscal transfer) 
of the audited governments of 13 provincial capital cities exceeded 
20 per cent, with 38.01 per cent as the highest ratio at the end of 
2012; the debt/asset ratio of 68 of the above-mentioned 223 ﬁnanc-
ing vehicle companies of the 36 local governments exceeded 70 per 
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cent. Furthermore, the income of 151 out of the 223 ﬁnancing vehicle 
companies was insufﬁcient to repay the principal and interest due 
in 2012. According to the National Audit Ofﬁce (2011), the period 
of 2012-2013 was the beginning of the peak period for local debt 
coming into repayment. The total debt to be repaid by ﬁnancing 
vehicle companies should have been at least RMB 1.84 trillion in 
2012 and will be at least RMB 1.22 trillion in 2013. This is a huge 
challenge for these ﬁnancing vehicle companies.
6. The default rate has been increasing since 2010. According to the 
National Audit Ofﬁce (2011), one ﬁfth of the 6,500 ﬁnancing vehi-
cle companies on its list registered a loss at the end of 2010. Some 
defaults occurred already in 2010. The default rate of local govern-
ments in four prefecture-level cities and 23 counties exceeded 10 
per cent. According to the National Audit Ofﬁce (2013), the default 
rate relating to the repayments of the consolidated debt (including 
direct debt, guarantees and other related debt) of the above men-
tioned 36 audited local governments was 0.75 per cent at the end 
of 2012, up 0.48 of a percentage point from 2010. The default rate of 
the governments of two audited provincial capital cities exceeded 
10 per cent, with the highest reaching 16.36 per cent at the end of 
2012. According to the National Audit Ofﬁce (Nie 2013), the ratio of 
repayments based on new borrowing exceeded 55 per cent among 
358 out of the more than 6,500 ﬁnancing vehicle companies, and 
the default rate of around 150 exceeded 16 per cent in 2011. Such 
repayment arrangements are almost a synonym for hidden defaults. 
Consequently, news reports on defaults that took place in 2012 are 
just the tip of the iceberg.10  
7. There is a lack of effective control by both of the central government 
and local citizens of local governments' debt ﬁnancing behaviour 
that is characterized by a continuous expansion of the debt size with 
accumulating ﬁscal and ﬁnancial risks.
Apart from some technical problems, a large share of the above-men-
tioned problems can be traced back to a series of institutional shortcom-
ings in the governmental system of China. 
1. There is a lack of local democracy in ﬁscal decision-making, in-
cluding decisions on debt ﬁnancing and in the management and 
supervision of ﬁscal affairs. The power of local governments is not 
restricted by local citizens, but rather selectively restricted by the 
central government that is facing a problem of asymmetric informa-
tion in its supervision of local governments' behaviour.    
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2. Chinese local party and government leaders are appointed rather 
than actually elected, so they are more responsible to the upper 
level of party organs and government than to local citizens.11 
3. In general, one of the most important criteria to measure the perform-
ance of local government leaders is still the economic performance 
of their jurisdictions (Figure 1), and good economic performance 
in terms of a high GDP growth rate is essential for their careers.12 
Investment in infrastructure is a key factor in attracting investment 
in local industries.13    
4. The term of ofﬁce of local government leaders is ﬁve years and they 
are not liable for the debt repayment after their leave. 
5. Fiscal revenue has been centralized since the 1994 ﬁscal reform, 
which leads to strategic actions by local governments, including the 
large-scale sale of land use rights and deﬁcit ﬁnancing. The 2008 
global ﬁnancial crisis allowed more leeway for local governments 
to raise more debt. 
The above analysis shows that the ﬁscal and ﬁnancial risks have been 
mounting. It would be fatal to underestimate their threat to ﬁscal and 
ﬁnancial stability in China. This partial loss of control has brought about 
and exacerbated debt and could lead to widespread ﬁnancial crises that 
are already brewing. The new borrowings used for old debt repayments 
and the defaults that have occurred up to now are clear-cut signals of a 
looming ﬁscal crisis. Since most of the borrowings are money from banks 
or the inter-bank market, the looming ﬁscal crisis has already spread over 
to ﬁnancial risks in the banking sector. The banking sector has already 
accumulated a relatively high non-performing loan (NPL) rate because 
of local government debt ﬁnancing. However, the NPLs are mainly hid-
den behind new loans after loan restructuring. The whole process is a 
dangerous trip toward a fatal collapse of the ﬁnancial system. 
Chinese economic growth has slowed since 2011. Given the high level 
of local government debt, the new leadership has distanced itself from 
launching a new stimulus package that would lead almost inevitably 
to a ﬁscal and ﬁnancial crisis. In addition, the real level of existing lo-
cal government debt still needs to be clariﬁed and it is a ticking time 
bomb. That is why the National Audit Ofﬁce, in August 2013, started 
a new round of audits of local government debt, aimed at thoroughly 
checking on the local debt situation.
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Overall Management and Characteristics of Urban 
Investment Bonds and Local Government Bonds in China
As shown in Table 1, local governments currently use mainly bank 
capital in their deﬁcit ﬁnancing, while urban investment bonds and 
local government bonds are secondary. However, urban investment 
bonds and local government bonds deserve special attention since bond 
issuance and management are essential to ensure transparency of local 
government debt, if bonds are standardized and become their major 
debt ﬁnancing channel.
Municipal bonds are a common, internationally accepted method 
of issuing local government debt. This kind of debt instrument is not 
limited to municipal governments and includes bonds issued by all 
levels of government below the national level. In general, municipal 
bonds cannot be used to cover regular budgetary deﬁcits of local gov-
ernments and can only be used for speciﬁc purposes. First, they are 
used to make up for differences in tax revenue and expenditure or to 
resolve problems caused by temporary ﬁscal operations. Second, they 
are used to provide ﬁnancial support for various public capital invest-
ment programmes such as the maintenance of public works, building 
of schools, water drainage systems, etc. Third, they are used to support 
and subsidize programmes that spur local development and improve 
the lives of local residents, including the building of industrial parks, 
parking lots, etc. (Fisher 1996). 
In a broad sense, municipal bonds refer to bonds issued by local 
governments or other authorized agencies and guaranteed by local gov-
ernments. Funds collected are mainly used for the construction of local 
public infrastructure. In mature economies such as the United States, 
municipal bonds usually have four speciﬁc characteristics (Ba and Xing 
2009): they are issued by the local government or an authorized agency 
thereof; the collected funds are used for the construction of public infra-
structure at the municipal/local level; there is a diverse range of sources 
for repayment; and they enjoy special tax-free exemptions. 
It is necessary to compare urban investment bonds and local govern-
ment bonds with the standard municipal bonds in the world and look 
into the features of these two kinds of Chinese 'municipal bonds'.
Urban Investment Bonds
Urban investment bonds are issued as enterprise bonds by ﬁnancing 
vehicle companies that are owned or controlled by local governments 
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in China. The ﬁrst such company was founded in 1992 in Shanghai city, 
and the ﬁrst urban investment bond was issued by a ﬁnancing vehicle 
company in Chongqing city in 2012. In the period 2008–2012, the total 
amount of urban investment bonds issued was around RMB 1.36 billion 
(see Figure 4). They basically meet the standards for municipal bonds, 
but are not tax free. In this regard, urban investment bonds can be re-
garded as 'quasi municipal bonds'. The funds raised are used for the 
building of public infrastructure. In this regard, the ﬁnancing vehicle 
companies are in fact similar to subordinate departments of local govern-
ments, companies in which they have controlling shares or agencies of 
local governments. Local governments also provide them with hidden 
guarantees. Therefore, local governments and ﬁnancing vehicle compa-
nies can be regarded as a single entity with mutual obligations. 
Urban investment bonds are transacted in the interbank debt market. 
The explosion of urban investment bonds is related to the increasing 
rate of urbanization and even more so to the demand of local govern-
ments for the expansion of their spending in the face of global ﬁnancial 
crisis. Urban investment bonds issued in 2009 totalled RMB 159.2 billion, 
while the amount issued in 2012 reached a record high of RMB 646.79 
billion (Figure 4).
FIGURE 4: Amount of Newly Issued Urban Investment Bonds in 
China (2008–2012)
Sources: Zhao (2010); China Industry Research Net (2012); Zhang (2013); Yang (2013). 
The operation of the urban investment bonds has the following 
general characteristics:
1.  They are issued by ﬁnancing vehicle companies, which are in fact 
issuing them on behalf of the local government;
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2.  While urban investment bonds are issued as enterprise bonds, they 
actually function as municipal bonds;
3.  Local governments provide hidden guarantees, which means that 
if there is the risk of defaulting, the local government will step in 
and provide assistance and bailouts;
4.  The cost of ﬁnancing is higher than the average level for enterprise 
bonds. According to research by He and Man (2011), the average 
coupon rate for bonds issued by ﬁnancing vehicle companies from 
2006 to 2009 was 5.72 per cent, while the rate for enterprise bonds 
of the same period was 5.63 per cent. The explanation for this is that 
the higher cost of ﬁnancing for urban investment bonds reﬂected 
the market actors' concern about risk;  
5.  The capital brought in by ﬁnancing vehicle companies is generally 
used by local governments for public infrastructure projects and the 
company itself is not actually obligated to repay the debt. The party 
responsible for repayment is the work unit or the local government 
to which it belongs;
6.  Urban investment bonds and the entities that issue them are not 
subject to local democratic processes;
7.  Because the debt owed by local governments is generally rather 
large, the risk of defaulting is also high. This makes the risk of de-
faulting on urban investment bonds also relatively high.
Local Government Bonds
The experiment with the issuance of local government bonds started in 
2009. The total balance of local government bonds was RMB 650 billion 
at the end of 2012, which makes up only 2.6 per cent of the total debt of 
local governments in China. Most local government bonds are issued 
by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of local governments. The Ministry 
charged an issuance fee at a rate of 0.5 per cent and 1.0 per cent of the 
face value of the bonds issued in 2012. Only Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guang-
dong and Shenzhen are part of a trial self-issuing pilot programme be-
gun in 2012. The government bonds issued by trial provinces or cities 
are ﬁxed-rate bonds with a term structure of three years or ﬁve years 
and made up 50 per cent of all bond issuances approved by the State 
Council. Local governments below these levels of government do not 
have access to this ﬁnancing instrument. But the provinces or cities that 
receive funds through the above issuance of local government bonds 
are allowed to on-lend the funds to lower level of governments. All of 
the local government bonds are to be repaid by the Ministry on behalf 
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of these local governments. It is obvious that local governments lack 
local autonomy and local democracy in the whole process, which make 
them only 'quasi municipal bonds'. 
The central government is still in control of any payment crisis that 
may result from its issuing these bonds on behalf of local governments 
or issuing them by local governments themselves since the central 
government itself is in charge of repayment on behalf of all the relevant 
local governments. 
The major characteristics of local government bonds are as follows:
1.  The introduction of local government bonds used a central gov-
ernment 'top-down' format, but its motivation comes from local 
governments' need to issue bonds. The Ministry of Finance has 
played a key role in this area;
2.  The central government emphasizes that it is acting as an agent to 
control the risk of bonds and ensure against default;
3.  The amount of bonds that can be issued has been increasing, but is 
still limited. It has increased from RMB 200 billion in 2009 to RMB 
350 billion in 2013;
4.  Currently, only provincial level governments and Shenzhen as a 
special economic zone are allowed to issue local government bonds 
directly. However, the issuance has not been extended to all levels 
of local government, including the various levels of government 
under them;
5.  The overall operations lack local autonomy and local democracy. 
However, it will be difﬁcult to use the current top-down control 
mechanism as a springboard to true municipal bonds. Local de-
mocracy is needed to turn this kind of bond into true municipal 
bonds.
Framework of Rules for Local Government Debts and 
Bond Issuance
As the local governments' debts have been mounting to a critical level 
since 2008, increasing local ﬁscal transparency and restricting local 
governments' behaviour has also become a necessity. Management of 
revenue and expenditure, including the power to issue debt for ﬁnanc-
ing, is one of the competencies that local governments should have under 
the tax sharing system. Local government debts are a reality and the 
causes are complex. Simply forbidding local governments to raise debts 
by issuing debt bonds, or not giving local governments full status to issue 
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and repay their own debt bonds, will not effectively stop local govern-
ments from collecting fees and raising debts in other ways. Quite the 
opposite, it will push these fee collections and debt ﬁnancing activities 
out of the formal ﬁscal system, not only breeding illegal practices, but 
also threatening ﬁnancial stability and China's macroeconomic balance. 
Allowing and standardizing taxation and debt ﬁnancing, including the 
issuing by local governments of municipal bonds, is the only way to 
solve current problems at their root.
Allowing local governments to issue municipal bonds simply requires 
clear limits on use and supervision. Once a certain scale is reached and 
it is cost effective, this is the most effective way to legalize current local 
government debt practices and make them more transparent and stand-
ardized. To a great extent, not only will this relieve the ﬁscal pressure 
felt by local governments, it will also allow China's strict bond regula-
tion system to make these types of programmes more transparent and 
standardized (An and Wang 2000; Gu 2000; Wei 2004; Xu 2001). As the 
content of this paper does not cover the entire debt issuing system, we 
simply attempted to analyse what has been said thus far and listed a few 
of the major problems facing local governments' bond issuance. Based 
on this, we can now propose basic policies from a constitutional and 
regulatory perspective. The main focus will be on clarifying the whole 
necessary institutional framework and local government responsibilities, 
and strengthening rule-based constraints, thus preventing uncontrolled 
expansion of local debts to which no one is held accountable.
1. A proper political reform is needed to constrain local government 
behaviour. This would consist of: 
 Enforcement of a constitutional reform and public participation. The 
constitution, ﬁscal constitution or any other basic law should clearly 
stipulate the power of local governments to manage public affairs, 
collect taxes and arrange expenditures. This will strengthen the 
sense of responsibility that governments feel to the people within 
their jurisdiction. In terms of municipal bond issuance and other 
ﬁscal decision-making processes, it will strengthen channels through 
which the public can participate. When organizing funding for and 
implementation of major municipal construction projects, it may 
also be advisable to have a referendum or hearing on the matter.
 Introduction of local autonomy and democracy. This can help standardize 
the handling of local government debts, urban investment bonds 
and local government bonds. It can force local governments to ar-
range their expenditure based on local citizens' preferences and the 
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competencies of local governments. They can then raise funds based 
on need, through both taxation and debt issuance. Local autonomy 
refers to self-determination and self-governance by local citizens in 
the provision of local public goods and services, which differs from 
any idea of political independence or separation.
2. Strict rules of ﬁscal surveillance, auditing and supervision should 
be established and followed: 
 Strengthening ﬁscal surveillance. The core of the current problem is 
the uncontrolled expansion of local government debt, which may 
also be the biggest risk of allowing local governments to openly 
issue debts. Even if a number of measures could be conceived of to 
hedge this type of risk, the best policies must also have clear debt 
ceilings for each level of government at a higher legal level (ideally 
at the constitutional level). An example of this would be the local 
setting of upper limits based on the ratio of local government debt 
to local GDP or local ﬁscal revenue (these upper limits could be 
further divided into those for an emergency and general situations 
within the respective jurisdictions).
 Auditing and supervisory regulation. Strict accounting procedures and 
standardized accounting records should also be put into place to al-
low for independent ﬁscal audits. There is also a need for a national 
committee to develop regulations on municipal bonds that place 
limits on the actions of local governments. These regulations would 
also deal with the underwriting of municipal bonds, broker–dealers 
and banks.14
3. A set of concrete ﬁscal rules for local government debt ﬁnancing, 
including municipal bond issuance, should be established and en-
forced:
 Uses of municipal bonds and reasons for their issuance. Considering the 
lack of standardization in the operations of local governments in 
China as well as their wide range of responsibilities, it is necessary 
to strictly limit the uses of municipal bonds and the reasons for their 
issuance, especially in issuing bonds to balance budget deﬁcits. One 
possibility is the establishment of conditions for bond issuance, 
allowing local governments to issue bonds only if the overall debt 
levels and the budget deﬁcits are kept within a certain range, for 
instance, for three consecutive years. Furthermore, authorization to 
issue bonds would be revoked for the following ﬁscal year should 
the government incur a large ﬁscal deﬁcit. In considering the difﬁ-
culty of external supervision and the possibility of local governments 
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deliberately using funds for other purposes, one option when ﬁrst 
issuing municipal bonds could be to only allow local governments 
to issue revenue bonds with clear-use purposes (as in the building 
of a local roadway) instead of general obligation bonds. As local 
democratic ﬁscal procedures improve, this could be relaxed to in-
clude general obligation bonds.
 Debt issuing entities and procedures. To change the current chaos of 
governments, their various departments and even companies or 
public service units under their charge (such as public schools and 
hospitals), so that debt raising is predictable and transparent, only 
a single or relatively limited number of speciﬁed entities would be 
authorized to issue debt (i.e. government ﬁnancial departments). 
Procedures for issuing debt must be standardized by law, includ-
ing methods for application, approval, credit rating, commissioned 
agencies and public placement. The forced proportional distribution 
of debt must also be prohibited. Purchasing qualiﬁcations should 
also be more closely controlled, prohibiting administrative work 
units and companies with a certain portion of state-owned assets 
from purchasing, to prevent covert proportional distribution.
 Internal controls and external supervision. Due to the difﬁculty of 
quickly establishing a democratic system that can respond to the 
preferences of local residents in the short term, a plausible option 
for internal control is to strengthen the power of the local people's 
congress. Requirements can be put in place that a single bond or 
a series of bonds to be used for a speciﬁc project of a certain scale 
must go through hearings and be approved by the people's congress 
(and consultative committee). External supervision is usually car-
ried out by ﬁnancial authorities, but as a transitional measure, the 
supervisory powers of higher levels of government and the people's 
congress could be strengthened. This can be done in such a way 
that local debt issuances above a certain scale must be approved by 
a higher level of government or the people's congress, based on a 
minimum standard. They can also be required to submit periodic 
reports on the state of the debt, its market price and efﬁciency.
 Procedures for passing on debt to new administrations. When a new ad-
ministration comes in or major ofﬁcials are replaced, a major audit 
of debt must be carried out. The scale of the debt issued during a 
term and the efﬁciency of its use during a certain period of time 
after that term has ended should be included in the evaluation of 
the Party or government ofﬁcial in ofﬁce when the debt was issued. 
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This could, to a certain extent, prevent excessive debt due to short-
sightedness.
 Repayment of Debt. To ensure that the principal and interest on debt 
is paid in a timely manner, a repayment fund should be established 
that holds a portion of revenue periodically placed in the fund 
from projects funded by municipal bonds. An order of priority 
for sources of loan repayment should also be established, setting a 
ceiling and ratio for the amount of tax revenue to be used for their 
repayment. Laws should also be passed that clearly deﬁne under 
what ﬁnancial circumstances or what kind of revenue situation for 
a speciﬁc project constitutes a payment crisis. This could prevent 
local governments from deliberately not paying debts. Currently, 
government bankruptcy is not a feasible option (this would increase 
the moral risk that governments face). One option may be to extend 
payment periods or allow governments to make partial payments, 
which would eliminate the idea that a government will get off on 
a ﬂuke. This would leave some risk in place and prevent investors 
from ignoring risk and investing too much.
 Joint responsibility between governments. Currently, lower levels of 
government are generally responsible to higher levels of government. 
It must be clariﬁed what debts and in what situations higher levels 
of government would take on what portion of debt responsibility for 
lower governments. This would prevent lower levels of government 
from making opportunistic decisions. Similarly, it must be clariﬁed 
what portion of debt responsibility lower levels of government have 
when issuing municipal bonds through higher levels of government. 
This will keep higher levels of government from improperly using 
administrative powers to transfer debt responsibilities.
 Clariﬁcation of borders between ﬁscal behaviour and ﬁnancial market 
behaviour of local governments. It should be taken into account that 
local governments may very well try to obtain capital through 
banks. Since local governments have the power to interfere directly 
or indirectly in the affairs of local banking institutions or the local 
branches of banking institutions operating nation-wide,15 a clear 
line must be drawn between the employment of different types of 
ﬁnancial instruments, such as municipal bonds, and bank loans. 
Whether in terms of underwriting loans, purchasing, transacting 
or repaying loans, governments must not be allowed to directly or 
indirectly use capital from lending organizations to repay munici-
pal bonds. However, this does not preclude lending organizations 
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from participating in the above-mentioned processes. Limitations 
on participation of lending organizations can be adjusted based on 
the direct or indirect interference of local governments, allowing 
for them to be tightened, relaxed or removed altogether.
 Development and supervision of secondary market of municipal bonds. 
After a large-scale issuance of municipal bonds, it may be necessary 
to establish a market for municipal bonds in secondary markets, 
including national, regional and local over-the-counter markets.
 Standardization of historical debts and linking them to new debts. As 
nearly all levels of government have some debt burden and a large 
portion of that is unrecoverable, the need by local governments to 
issue new debts to repay old debts is especially urgent. Before local 
democratic procedures are introduced, if there are no essential ﬁscal 
restrictions on local liabilities, such as setting an upper limit ratio of 
local GDP to ﬁscal revenue, laws must be put into place to strictly 
prohibit reﬁnancing by issuing new municipal bonds. If this kind 
of restriction is put into place, prohibiting the reﬁnancing would be 
unnecessary. In any case, there must be certain restrictions in place 
on new debts for a single project. The best option would be to put 
procedures in place for the approval of new debt ﬁnancing of the 
same projects that require a certain portion of the previous debts 
to be paid off and revenue from these projects to have reached a 
certain level before new debts can be incurred.16
Concluding Remarks
The above-mentioned problems are only a major part of the problems 
with local government debt ﬁnancing and bond issuance. There are no 
doubt many that have not been included. However, the key problem 
is that while we do support a standardized system that allows for local 
government liabilities as a channel for ﬁnancing of local governments 
in China, it must be emphasized that municipal bonds alone cannot 
resolve the root of these problems. If this is not handled properly, it 
may result in a negative outcome. The most obvious example of this is 
China's stock market, where a few investors proﬁted greatly and the 
vast majority of opportunistic investors lost out. The problem of low 
efﬁciency of state-owned enterprises was not resolved through the es-
tablishment of the stock market. From a wider historical perspective, it 
actually delayed the resolution of the root problem because of constant 
blood transfusions.
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There are similar problems present in local government debt. Only a 
very small part of the problem of local government debt in China can be 
traced back to the public goods nature of some goods and services that 
local governments provide. Most problems of local government debt 
are connected to the lack of constitutional and ﬁscal rules constraining 
the central government and local governments, the absence of local de-
mocracy, the pressure of ﬁscal competition and economic performance 
in individual regions, the over-investment and excessive construction 
connected with it, the repercussions of ﬁscal reforms since 1994 that 
resulted in the centralization of ﬁscal revenue, and the haphazard 
changes in the terms of ofﬁcials at higher levels of government. None 
of these problems can be resolved by simply issuing municipal bonds. 
Allowing issuance of municipal bonds is an opportunity that could bring 
these problems to the debate table and see resolution as the framework 
that manages municipal bonds is perfected. If issuing municipal bonds 
has ultimately only given local governments another vehicle to legally 
make money and higher levels of government more of an opportunity 
to push their responsibilities downward and gain more ﬁscal power, 
then not only will these problems go unresolved, the issue of local debts 
will most likely become increasingly serious and ultimately irreparable. 
As this article has tried to express, which of these two futures is chosen 
will fully depend on establishing a framework of rules and properly 
implementing those rules.
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NOTES
1  In this article, all levels of government below the national level are regarded as 'lo-
cal'.  
2  According to Breton (1996), the 'competitive governments' paradigm refers to the fact 
that there is inter-, intra- and extra-governmental competition in federations such as 
the USA and Canada, while according to Levitsky and Way (2013: 5), the 'competi-
tive authoritarianism' paradigm refers to regimes that 'are civilian regimes in which 
formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining 
power, but in which fraud, civil liberties violations, and abuse of state and media 
resources so skew the playing ﬁeld that the regime cannot be labeled democratic'. 
Both paradigms stress the self-interest-driven competition of governments as a key 
feature that drives the political life in relevant countries. However, the competitive 
nature of a multi-layer government system doesn't only exist in real democracies 
_________________________________________________________________________49
__________________________ Local Government Debt and Municipal Bonds in China
or authoritarian quasi-democracies, but also in a formally unitary system such as 
the Chinese one. That is why it makes sense to extend the use of such paradigms to 
the Chinese system.
3  For the typical features of a 'leviathan', see Hobbes (1651) and Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980). 
4  In the following, the terms 'urban investment bonds' and 'local government bonds' 
refer to these two concrete types of bonds.
5  System-external revenue, or 'zhidu wai shouru', consists of illegal levies imposed by 
local governments upon the economy. They include 'arbitrary fund raising, arbitrary 
fee charging, and arbitrary cost apportion' (called 'san luan' in Chinese) by local 
governments. 
6  These 36 local governments audited by the National Audit Ofﬁce (2013) are govern-
ments of 15 provinces and those of their 15 respective capital cities, and governments 
of 3 municipalities under direct administration by the central government and those 
of their 3 districts. The narrowly deﬁned debt balance of their vehicle companies and 
the debt balance of local government departments and institutions took 45.67 per 
cent and 25.37 per cent of their total debt balance at the end of 2012, respectively. 
In the audit report, all data refer only to the individual levels of local government 
and do not encompass the lower levels of local government. This applies in the fol-
lowing part of this article.  
7  Local pension funds in many jurisdictions often run on almost empty or half-empty 
accounts. Funds are often diverted by local governments for other uses. They also do 
not pay in sufﬁcient funds for employees from the public sector or local state-owned 
enterprises. This hidden debt is related to the amount that local governments have to 
inject into the pension funds to pay pensions as required by the law (Wang 2013).
8  The People's Bank of China and China Banking Regulatory Commission on 18 March 
2009 jointly released 'Guiding Opinions on Further Strengthening the Adjustment of 
the Loan Structure to Push Forward a Stable and Relatively Rapid Development of 
the National Economy' to encourage local governments to establish local ﬁnancing 
vehicle companies. 
9  Already on 10 June 2010, the State Council issued a 'Notice on Problems Related 
to the Strengthening of the Management of Local Government Financing Vehicle 
Companies' (Document No. guofa (2010) 19) and ordered debt ﬁnancing of vehicle 
companies to be put in order and the management of these companies strengthened. 
The National Audit Ofﬁce conducted a wide-scale survey of the debt of local ﬁnanc-
ing vehicle companies, starting at the end of 2010 and released a report on 'Audit 
Results on Local Government Debt in the Whole Country' (Report No. (2011) 35) 
on 27 June 2011. The report revealed the audit results on local governments' debt 
ﬁnancing across China. Later on, various notices of the National Development and 
Reform Commission, People's Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Com-
mission, and Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Land were issued, strengthening the 
control of loan disbursements and debt issuance, restriction of the qualiﬁcation as 
vehicle companies, restrictions on using land transfer revenue as a pledge, prohibi-
tion of false capital registration and under-collateralization, etc. 
10  The storm surrounding the default of Yunnan Province Roads Development Co., 
Ltd. ('Yunnan Roads') on its loans is a perfect example and marked the start of the 
vehicle company debt crisis. It is a vehicle company associated with the government 
of Yunnan province. In April 2011, Yunnan Roads issued a letter to the bank lender 
saying that they would pay only the interest and not the principle. Yunnan Roads 
had nearly RMB 100 billion in loans from more than ten banks including the China 
Construction Bank, the National Development Bank and ICBC (Shi 2012). After the 
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debt problem became known, the company retracted the letter on the advice of the 
provincial government, which then came out to discuss repayment of the loans in 
the company's place and avoided an all-out crisis. However, the scare of default 
sent unexpected shock waves through the urban investment bond market and new 
bonds were not issued for a period of time afterwards.
11 Local party or government leaders are ﬁrst nominated within the Party or the ad-
ministration, examined by the organizational department of the party secretariat at 
the local and the next higher level, and ﬁnally approved by the next higher level of 
the party secretariat after the ceremonial or ritual 'elections' through the local party 
congress or local people's congress, respectively. The core principle is that the cadres 
are to be led by the Party according to the CCP's 'Regulation on the Selection and 
Appointment of Party and Government Leaders' of 23 July 2002. 
12 See Zhou (2007). Zhou's analysis shows that the close connections of the career of 
local government leaders to local economic performance constitutes a strong posi-
tive incentive for these leaders to promote local economic development.     
13  Some provinces, for instance Guangdong province, in 2012 started with the change 
of performance criteria for local leaders, to include other criteria such as the im-
provement of economic structure, the reduction of resource use per unit of GDP, 
environmental protection, autonomous innovations, coverage of public services for 
the migrant population, etc. However, economic performance is still a key criterion. 
Only in non-development zones where economic activities are in general forbid-
den, is economic performance no longer a criterion in that province (Chen and Wu 
2012).
14  Here we can learn from the experience of the United States. In 1975, the United States 
established the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, which was responsible for 
creating rules that regulated broker–dealers and banks.
15  For example, the current practice of local banking institutions such as rural credit 
cooperatives, requiring an endorsement from the local party committee to put in 
or remove management from their positions provides a route for local government 
interference.
16 This suggestion is based on lessons from the improper operation of China's stock 
markets. Many of the listed companies on China's stock exchanges used allotments 
or extensions to collect a large amount of capital from small investors. Regulations 
limiting this type of practice only came into effect recently.
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